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Abstract:
The paper asks under what conditions vertically di¤erentiated duopolists
engage in rst-degree price discrimination. Each rm decides rst on a pric-
ing regime and subsequently sets prices.The paper shows that when unit cost
is an increasing and convex function of quality the discriminatory regime is
a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game. This is true for a very
general distribution of consumer preferences. In contrast to the case of hor-
izontal di¤erentiation, the equilibrium is not necessarily Pareto-dominated
by a bilateral commitment to price uniformly. The paper also shows that
the qualities chosen by perfectly discriminating duopolists are welfare max-
imizing. It explains nally why a threat of entry may induce an incumbent
monopolist to engage in price discrimination.
Key words: personalized pricing, vertical di¤erentiation.
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
Until recently, economists viewed rst-degree discrimination as a theoreti-
cal construct without real world applications. The primary reason was that
sellers did not possess information about the reservation prices of individ-
ual buyers. Unsurprisingly, the literature on rst-degree-discrimination re-
mained scarce. A notable exception arose in spatial economics. Because the
distance is can be observed and because it correlates with transportation
cost, the spatial economics literature often assumed that the mill price a
seller could charge a buyer increased with the distance that separated him
from that buyer (Hurter and Lederer, 1985, Lederer and Hurter, 1986, Thisse
and Vives, 1988, Hamilton and Thisse, 1992, Ulph and Vulkan, 2000, 2001,
Bhaskar and To, 2004).
Perceptions about the practicality of rst-degree-discrimination have changed
along with advances in information gathering/processing techniques and the
spread of computer-mediated transactions. (Shapiro and Varian, 1999, Var-
ian, 2003). These developments have spawned a literature that explores how
on-line sellers with market power exploit information about consumer prefer-
ences through personalization of prices and product specications (Fudenberg
and Tirole, 2000, Acquisti and Varian, 2001, Varian, 2003).1
The improved capacity to gather and process information has also inu-
enced pricing in traditional trading environments. Personalized discounting
has become common at the check-out counter as sellers tailor promotional
o¤ers according to current purchases.2 Financial institutions also engage in
personalization when they customize o¤ers to individualsnancial ability
and payment history. Journal publishers use information to adapt on-line
subscription fees to the characteristics of individual academic libraries.3
A particular form of personalized pricing takes place in aftermarkets
where rms earn high margins selling replacement parts whose wear and
tear increase with intensity of use.4 And, in markets where intellectual prop-
1The terms personalized pricingand rst-degree price discriminationare used in-
terchangeably. First-degree price discrimination as used by Pigou(1920) refers to pricing
that takes place when full information about consumersdemand is available and allows
sellers to tailor prices to individual consumers. It does not necessarily describe a situation
where all consumer surplus is captured by the producer(s) (See Stole, 2003).
2Some of the techniques used in online retailing are described at
http://www.accenture.com/Global/Services/Accenture_Technology_Labs/R_and_I/PersonalizedPricingTool.htm
3See Edlin and Rubinfeld (2004)
4See e.g. Emch (2003)
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erty is licensed, personalized pricing did not await the emergence of on-line
technologies. Royalties have traditionally depended on intensity of use.
Clearly, sellers capacity to engage in personalized pricing depends on
their ability to restrict reselling by rst buyers. To limit reselling, software
producers sell a non-transferable right to use their products; they do not sell
the products.
Personalization of prices requires that sellerscosts not increase too fast
as the number of price categories expands. On-line technologies are valuable
in this regard as well because they facilitate customization in the absence of
face-to-face contact.
The combined e¤ect of these developments is to allow a form of pricing
that approaches rst-degree price discrimination. First-degree price discrim-
ination remains a limiting case. In some market though actual pricing to is
much to rst-degree discrimination than in the past.
The paper examines personalized pricing in a market served by a quality
di¤erentiated duopoly. It addresses four questions. (1) What are the proper-
ties of a non-cooperative equilibrium in which each duopolist sets a perfectly
discriminating price schedule? (2) Under what conditions would rms prefer
to engage in personalized pricing if they had the means to enforce an agree-
ment to price uniformly? (3) Does rst-degree price discrimination perform
better in terms of consumer surplus and global welfare than uniform pricing?
(4) How do the quality choices of perfectly discriminating duopolists measure
up in terms of welfare?
The paper addresses these questions in a framework similar to the model
Thisse and Vives (1988) have used to examine the choice of pricing regimes
by horizontally di¤erentiated duspolists. Like Thisse and Vives (1988) the
paper nds that a transition from uniform to discriminatory pricing a¤ects
prots via two channels: An enhanced capacity to extract surplus from some
buyers and an intensication of competition for the patronage of other buy-
ers.5 However, the results di¤er from Thisse and Vives (1988) in regard to
the existence of a prisoners dilemma. When di¤erentiation is horizontal both
duopolists are better o¤by enforcing an agreement to price uniformly. When
di¤erentiation is vertical the Nash equilibrium in discriminatory price sched-
ules is not always Pareto dominated by such agreement. The paper shows
5Ulph and Vulkan (2000) develop a similar model. They nd that a switch from uniform
pricing to discriminatory pricing boosts prots when transport cost increases rapidly with
distance.
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that a prisoners dilemma arises if and only if the ratio of market areas served
by the two rms lies within a certain interval whose bounds can be calculated
using generally observable data.
While the paper is formally close to Choudhary et al. (2005), it is di¤erent
in spirit and addresses a wider set of issues. Specically, it determines a
pricing regime as an equilibrium strategy. Choudhary et al. (2005) focus on
the comparison of prices and qualities under alternative exogenously given
pricing regimes. Also, this paper assumes a more general distribution of
consumer preferences, and a more general cost function. 6
Section 2 introduces the model and section 3 characterizes the equilibrium
that emerges from the simultaneous choice of discriminatory price schedules
by the two rms. It establishes that personalized prices are not monotonic in
consumerswillingness to pay. It shows why competition in discriminatory
price schedules yields a welfare maximizing market coverage, and a welfare
maximizing partition of the market into buyers of high and low quality. Sec-
tion 4 takes up the question whether discrimination by the duopolists is an
equilibrium strategy when the pricing regime is endogenous. Section 5 shows
that in contrast to the case of horizontal di¤erentiation, prior commitments
by both rms to set uniform prices does not necessarily enhance rmsprots.
It analyzes under what conditions it does. Section 6 endogenizes the choice of
qualities and establishes that duopolists who engage in discriminatory pricing
set qualities that maximize welfare. Section 7 provides concluding remarks
and examines implications for competition policy.
2 The model
Consider a market in which two rms serve a continuum of consumers. The
size of the market is normalized to one. Each rm produces a single variety
of a vertically di¤erentiated product. For convenience the varieties are called
high qualityand low quality and denoted sH and sL; where sH > sL > 0:
The producers of these qualities are caleld the high (H) and the low (L)
quality rms.
Consumers have preferences à la Mussa-Rosen (1978). Each consumer
is identied by a taste parameter  2 [0; b] distributed with positive and
continuous density f() over the interval [0; b]. A consumer buys a single
unit of high or low quality, or nothing at all. Consumer 0s reservation price
6The di¤erences are examined in greater detail in the body of paper.
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for a single unit of quality si is si (i 2 fH;Lg). Consumer  gets a surplus
si   pi() from a unit of quality si purchased at the price pi(); and a zero
surplus from no purchase. Consumers cannot resell.
The cost of producing qi units of quality si is C(si; qi) = c(si)qi where c(si)
denotes the unit cost of quality si. The function c(:) is twice di¤erentiable,
strictly increasing, and strictly convex. Specically :
c(0) = 0; c0(s) > 0; c00(s) > 0;8s > 0 (1)
The latter implies:
0 <
c(sL)
sL
<
c(sH)
sH
<
c(sH)  c(sL)
sH   sL ; 8sH > sL > 0 (2)
Because the paper focuses on producerschoices among pricing regimes,
it assumes that both rms are active under all regimes being considered.
Condition (3) below ensures this.
b >
c(sH)  c(sL)
sH   sL ; 8sH > sL > 0 (3)
The term price schedule refers to a positive valued function pi(:) dened
on [0; b] that species the price pi() at which rm i is willing to sell one unit
to consumer : A price schedule is uniform when a single price targets all
consumers. It is perfectly discriminating or personalized, when its component
prices vary according to the taste parameters of each individual consumers
that they target.
The paper examines four pricing regimes. Under the uniform regime, de-
noted (UH ; UL), both rms set uniform price schedules. Under the discrimina-
tory regime, denoted (DH ; DL), both rms set discriminatory price schedules.
The remaining regimes, denoted (UH ; DL) and (DH ; UL), are asymmetric.
One rm sets a uniform price acting as a Stackelberg leader, while the other
rm sets a perfectly discriminating schedule.
3 Regime (DH ; DL)
For any pair of price schedules (pH(:); pL(:)), the market areas served by rms
H and L are :
H(pH(:); pL(:)) = f 2 [0; b]=sH   pH() Max[0; sL   pL()]g (4)
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L(pH(:); pL(:)) = f 2 [0; b]=sL   pL() Max[0; sH   pH()]g (5)
Therefore, rms i prots (i 2 fH;Lg) are:
i(pH(:); pL(:)) =
Z
i(pH(:);pL(:))
[pi()  c(si)]f()d (6)
Firm i is said to have a monopoly position with respect to consumer  if
for any price schedule chosen by the rival j, it can attract that consumer
with a price si that leaves zero surplus to the consumer. Firm i is said to
have a cost-quality advantage over its rival j with respect to consumer  if
there exists a price pi() at which it can attract consumer  when the rival
j targets consumer  with a price equal to its unit cost c(sj). Clearly, a
rm that holds a monopoly position with respect to a consumer also holds a
cost-quality advantage over its rival with respect to the same consumer. The
converse is not true.
Proposition 1 characterizes the Nash equilibrium of the pricing game in
which both rms independently choose the discriminatory regime.
Proposition 1 The Nash equilibrium of the game in discriminatory price
schedules with payo¤s given by (6) is the pair (pH(); p

L()) dened by (7)
and (8) below where pH() and pL() are any price schedules above unit costs.
pH() =
8><>:
c(sL) + (sH   sL) if c(sH) c(sL)sH sL    b
c(sH) if
c(sH)
sH
  < c(sH) c(sL)
sH sL
pH()  c(sH) if 0   < c(sH)sH
(7)
pL() =
8>>><>>>:
c(sL) if
c(sH) c(sL)
sH sL    b
c(sH)  (sH   sL) if c(sH)sH   <
c(sH) c(sL)
sH sL
sL if
c(sL)
sL
  < c(sH)
sH
pL()  c(sL) if 0   < c(sL)sL
(8)
Proof :
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Under perfect discrimination each consumer pays a price determined
solely by that consumers preference for quality. This follows immediately
from the assumptions that reselling among consumers is impossible, and that
unit cost is independent of quantity. No rm sells below unit cost to any con-
sumer because doing so does not allow it to earn a larger prot from another
consumer. Therefore, competition in discriminatory price schedules adds up
to a collection of Bertrand games for individual consumers.
One can now examine the equilibrium in four market segments, using the
simplied notation cH for c(sH) and cL for c(sL):
1.  2
h
cH cL
sH sL ; b
i
When pL() = cL consumers derive positive surplus from purchasing low
quality. The highest price pH() at which they would purchase high quality
satises the condition sH   pH() = sL   cL which implies (7). When the
H -rm sets pH() = cL + (sH   sL); consumers obtain a surplus sL   cL
from high quality. They would purchase low quality only if it were priced
below unit cost, which is non protable. Therefore, pL() = cL is an optimal
response by rm L to the schedule pH(). Firm H enjoys a cost-quality ad-
vantage over rm L, but no monopoly position, with respect to all consumers
in the interval.
2.  2 [ cH
sH
; cH cL
sH sL [
For pL() = cH   (sH   sL) consumers in the interval obtain a surplus
sH   cH from low quality. Firm H can attract these consumers only by
pricing below unit cost. Because this yields a negative prot without pro-
ducing a compensatory increase in prots from consumers in other intervals,
a best response of rm H is to set the price cH . And, when pH() = cH ;
the highest price at which rm L can attract consumers satises the con-
dition sL   pL() = sH   cH which implies (7). Clearly, rm L has a
cost-quality advantage but no monopoly position with respect to consumers
in this interval.
3.  2 [ cL
sL
; cH
sH
[:
All price schedules above unit cost are optimal for rm H because rm
L holds a monopoly position in the interval. The best response of rm L is
to set pL() = sL which allows its capture of the entire consumer surplus.
4.  2 [0; cL
sL
[
Within this interval no rm can attract a consumer by pricing at unit cost
or higher. This is true for any price schedule chosen by the rival producer.
All pairs of schedules with no component below unit cost ensure zero sales
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and are therefore equilibria. QED
Substitution of (7) and (8) into (6) yields the equilibrium prots:
H(DH ; DL) =
Z b
cH cL
sH sL
[cL + (sH   sL)  cH ]f()d (9)
L(DH ; DL) =
Z cH
sH
cL
sL
[sL cL]f()d+
Z cH cL
sH sL
cH
sH
[cH (sH sL) cL]f()d(10)
Figure 1 displays the equilibrium.7 The lines labeled sH and sL repre-
sent the participation constraints for high and low quality buyers. The line
segment KM is the self-selection constraint faced by the high quality rm
when its rival sells at unit cost. Similarly, the line segment TL represents
the self-selection constraint faced by the low quality rm when its rival o¤ers
high quality at unit cost. The high quality rm serves the market segment
[ cH cL
sH sL ; b] and sets the price schedule represented by KM . The low quality
rm divides the consumers it serves into two segments. With respect to con-
sumers with  2 [ cL
sL
; cH
sH
[ it sets prices at which the participation constraint
is binding (V T in Figure 1). With respect to consumers with  2] cH
sH
; cH cL
sH sL ]
it sets prices at which the consumersself-selection constraint binds (TL in
Figure 1). Note that the price paid by these consumers decreases when their
reservation price increases. This result is akin to the absorption e¤ect in the
Thisse and Vives (1988) model .
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
The prot earned by the high quality rm from an individual consumer
is represented by the vertical distance between the line segment KM and the
horizontal line cH . Because the total prot is a weighted sum of these dis-
tances on the segment
h
cH cL
sH sL ; b
i
, we say that H(DH ; DL) is area(KMI);
keeping in mind that the area is properly dened by the integral (9). Simi-
larly, L(DH ; DL) is area(V TL).
7In the space (; p), the coordinates of points T , L, V;K, M and I are T = cHsH ;
pT = cH
sL
sH
, L = cH cLsH sL ; pL = cL; V =
cL
sL
; pV = cL, K = cH cLsH sL ; pK = cH , M = b;
pM = cL + b(sH   sL) and I = b; pI = cH :
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Proposition 1 entails the following:
Corollary: Personalized prices competition by quality di¤erentiated duopolists
(regime (DH ; DL)) yields a market coverage and a segmentation of consumers
into high and low quality buyers that maximize total welfare.
Proof:
Each unit sold to yields a positive total surplus larger than the total
surplus that would be have been generated from a sale to the same consumer
of a unit of the other quality. This follows from the fact that a consumer
who purchases low quality must gain less in utility from switching to high
quality than would be added in to the cost production. Similarly, a consumer
of high quality would lose more in utility from switching to low quality than
the saving in production cost. QED
4 Selecting a price policy.
One can now address the question whether price discrimination is an equi-
librium of a game in which rms can commit to price uniformly. Consider a
three-stage game. In the rst stage, each rm chooses whether to commit to
a uniform schedule. If the two rms commit, they sell at the second stage
at the prices they committed to. This is the regime (UH ; UL). If no rm
commits in the rst period, each remains free to set any price schedule in the
second stage. This is the regime (DH ; DL). If one of the duopolists commits
at the rst stage, it acts as a Stackelberg leader at the second stage, while
the other acts as a follower. These asymmetric regimes are denoted (UH ; DL)
and (DH ; UL).8 In all regimes, consumers make their purchasing decisions at
the last stage.
Committing to a uniform price can only be rational if it elicits a pricing
response on the part of the rival that is favorable to the rm that makes
the commitment. The credibility of such commitment may derive from sunk
investments in a distribution channel that puts intermediaries between man-
ufacturers and consumers and does not allow the former to ascertain individ-
ual consumer preferences. It can arise from a most-favored-customer clause
granted by the seller. It may also rest on a threat of reputational losses
8We show in appendix 1 that there does not exist a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
within the framework of a static game where the high quality rm chooses a uniform price
and the low quality rm chooses a perfectly discriminating price schedule. Thisse and
Vives (1988) nd the same for horizontal di¤erentiation.
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that would ensue from backing down on the pre-announced uniform price.
It is assumed that the rms committing to a uniform price take measures
that lend credibility to their commitment. Howver these measures are not
modeled.
4.1 Regime (UH ; DL)
Suppose that the H-rm sets a uniform price pH > cH . The best response
of the L-rm when is:
pL(; pH) =
8>>><>>>:
cL if
pH c(sL)
sH sL    b
pH   (sH   sL) if pHsH   <
c(sH) c(sL)
sH sL
sL if
c(sL)
sL
  < pH
sH
pL()  c(sL) if 0   < c(sL)sL
(11)
The prots are
L(pH ; pL(:)) =
Z pH
sH
cL
sL
[sL cL]f()d+
Z pH cL
sH sL
pH
sH
[pH (sH sL) cL]f()d (12)
H(pH ; pL(:; pH)) =
Z b
pH cL
sH sL
[pH   cH ]f()d (13)
Because H is a continuous function of pH ; there exists a pH that maxi-
mizes H over the compact set [cH ; bsH ] : The Stackelberg equilibrium of the
game where the H and L-rms act respectively as a leader and a follower is
the pair (pH ; pL(; p

H)) where pL(; pH) is given by (11).
Figure 2 displays the protsL(pH ; pL(:)) as area(V AB) andH(pH ; pL(:; pH))
as area(FGIN). Because cL
sL
< cH
sH
< cH cL
sH sL <
pH cL
sH sL , it must be true
that V TL  V AB or L(DH ; DL) < L(pH ; pL(:)): For the same reason,
FGIN  KMI or H(pH ; pL(:; pH)) < H(DH ; DL): One can therefore
conclude that a high quality rm that commits to the uniform price pH > cH
while its rival does not commit, earns less than it would earn if no one com-
mitted. This is true despite the fact that commitment bestows upon the high
quality rm a role of Stackelberg leader.
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INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
Upon dening pH = arg max
pH2[cH ;bsH ]
H(pH ; pL(:; pH)); one can write
H(UH ; DL)  H(pH ; pL(:; pH)) and L(UH ; DL)  L(pH ; pL(:; pH))
with pL(; pH) given by (11). Because H(pH ; pL(:; pH)) < H(DH ; DL)
holds true for any pH > cH it holds true for pH as well. Therefore:
H(UH ; DL) < H(DH ; DL) (14)
and
L(UH ; DL) > L(DH ; DL) (15)
Figure 2 claries the di¤erences between the (UH ; DL) and (DH ; DL)
regimes: i) Commitment by rm H to a uniform price pH > cH shifts the
self-selection constraint faced by the low quality rm upward (from TL to
AB) and shortens the self-selection constraint faced by the high quality rm
(fromKM to FM); ii) the market coverage is the same under the two regimes
although the market area served by the high quality rm is smaller under
(UH ; DL) regime than under the (DH ; DL) regime, and the market served by
the low quality rm is larger9; iii) the market area of the low quality buyers
who retain no surplus is larger under the (UH ; DL) regime than under the
(DH ; DL) regime.
4.2 Regime (DH ; UL)
Assume that the L-rm sets a uniform price pL > cL: Clearly pL  cH cannot
be sustained as an equilibrium because theH-rm could undercut the L-rm,
capture the market served by the L-rm, and increase its prot by doing so.
When the low quality rm commits to a uniform price pL 2 (cL; cH) the
best response of the high quality producer depends on whether  is larger
or smaller than cH pL
sH sL : For  <
cH pL
sH sL , any schedule pH()  cH yields zero
9This comes about because the rm that commits has no interest in competing agres-
sively for consumers who are more or less indi¤erent between the two qualities when each
is priced at unit cost. The reason it does not is that it would have to accept a lower margin
on sales to consumers with a strong preference for its quality.
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sales and is therefore a best response. Thus, the best response of rm H to
pL 2 (cL; cH) is :
pH(; pL) =

pL + (sH   sL) for  2 [ cH pLsH sL ; b]
pH()  cH for  < cH pLsH sL
(16)
Prots are:
H(pH(:; pL); pL) =
Z b
cH pL
sH sL
[pL + (sH   sL)  cH ]f()d (17)
L(pH(:; pL); pL) =
Z cH pL
sH sL
pL
sL
(pL   cL) f () d (18)
Note that the condition pL
sL
< cH pL
sH sL which ensures positive sales for the
L-rm [see (18)] is equivalent to sL
pL
> sH
cH
: Using the same arguments as
for regime (DL; UH) one can show H(pH(:; pL); pL) > H(DH ; DL) and
L(pH(:; pL); pL) < L(DH ; DL) which imply
L(DH ; UL) < L(DH ; DL)(19)
and
H(DH ; UL) > H(DH ; DL) (20)
One observes the following di¤erences between the (DH ; UL) and the
(DH ; DL) regimes: 1) Total market coverage is smaller under the (DH ,UL)
regime; ii) the segment served by the low quality rm is smaller under the
(DH ; UL) regime whereas the segment served by the high quality producer is
larger.
4.3 Regime (UH ; UL)
This is the standard regime examined in the literature. The concavity of
f() over [0; b] is a su¢ cient condition for the existence of an equilibrium for
an arbitrary distribution of consumer preferences:10 It is assumed that this
condition is met.
Existence of a Nash equilibrium in uniform prices together with (14) and
(19) imply the following proposition:
10See Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed (2005)
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Proposition 2 For any concave density function f(); personalization of
prices is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the three-stage game where: i/
vertically di¤erentiated duopolists determine whether or not to commit to a
specic uniform price in a rst stage; ii) in the second stage a rm that com-
mited acts as a Stackelberg leader stage vis-a-vis a rm that did not commit,
and if no one commited, both simultaneously set their price schedules; iii) in
the third stage consumers make their purchases.
For a general density function one cannot compare the prots under this
equilibrium with the prots generated under a mutual commitment to price
uniformly. To compare prots under the two pricing regimes, the next section
assumes a specic density function.
5 A prisoners dilemma?
The nding that price personalization constitutes a subgame perfect equi-
librium is the counterpart for quality di¤erentiation of the Thisse and Vives
(1998) result for horizontal di¤erentiation. Thisse and Vives (1998) also es-
tablished that spatially di¤erentiated duopolists would be better o¤ if they
enforced an agreement to set uniform prices. This section shows for the par-
ticular case of a uniform distribution of consumer preferences - also studied
by Thisse and Vives - that discrimination need not be Pareto dominated by
uniform pricing when di¤erentiation is vertical.
.
Table 1 displays the prots of the high and low quality rms for each of
the four pricing regimes for uniform f(:).11
11Appendix 2 gives the details of the derivation of Table 1.
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DL UL
DH
H =
sH sL
2b
[b  cH cL
sH sL ]
2
L =
sL
2b
[ cH cL
sH sL  
cL
sL
][ cH
sH
  cL
sL
]
H =
sH sL
2b
[b  1
2
( cH cL
sH sL +
cH
sH
)]2
L =
sL
4b
[ cH
sH
  cL
sL
][ cH cL
sH sL  
cL
sL
]
UH
H =
sH sL
4b
[b  cH cL
sH sL ]
2
L =
1
2b
sL(sH sL)
sH
[1
2
(b+ cH cL
sH sL ) 
cL
sL
]2
H =
4s2H(sH sL)
(4sH sL)2b [b  12(
cH cL
sH sL +
cH
sH
)]2
L =
4sLsH(sH sL)
(4sH sL)2b [
1
2
(b+ cH cL
sH sL ) 
cL
sL
]2
Table 1: Prots under four pricing regimes with uniform density
One shows rst that the Nash equilibrium (DH ; DL) is an equilibrium
in dominant strategies: It has already been established that H(DH ; DL) >
H(UH ; DL) and L(DH ; DL) > L(DH ; UL) for any distribution f(): Table
1 now shows that for a uniform f(); H(DH ; DL) = 2H(UH ; DL) and
L(DH ; DL) = 2L(DH ; UL).12 Moreover, one easily checks that 0 < sL <
sH entails 14 <
4s2H
(4sH sL)2 <
4
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implying H(DH ; UL) > H(UH ; UL) and
L(UH ; DL) > L(UH ; UL): Therefore, DH and DL are dominant strategies
for players H and L.
Dene now   sL=sH ; and   (b   cH cLsH sL )=(
cH cL
sH sL  
cL
sL
); i.e. repre-
sents the ratio of market segments served by the two rms under the regime
(DH ; DL). Consider the following intermediate result:
Lemma: There exist two functions FH() 
p
2
4 2p2  and FL() 
4 2p2 p
2
such that H(DH ; DL) > H(UH ; UL) if and only if  > FH()
and L(DH ; DL) > L(UH ; UL) if and only if  < FL().
Proof : See appendix 3.
The functions FH and FL which intersect for  = 0:343 partition the
(; ) space into the four regions shown in Figure 3.
Insert Figure 3
12In this regard Choudhary et al.(2005) make a computational mistake in the calculation
of H(UH ; DL) which leads them to conclude that it is equal to H(DH ; DL) [See their
expressions (2) and (5)[.
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Partition of the (; ) space
In region 1 where  and  are such that FH() <  < FL(); the
(DH ; DL) regime Pareto-dominates the (UH ; UL) regime. In region 2 where
 > max[FH(); FL()] rm H is better o¤ under the (DH ; DL) regime
whereas rm L prefers the (UH ; UL) regime. The opposite is true in re-
gion 3 where  < min[FH(); FL()]:13 It is only in region 4 where FL() <
 < FH() that the regime (DH ; DL) is Pareto dominated by the regime
(UH ; UL): Thus:
Proposition 3 When consumer preferences are uniform over [0,b] and unit
cost is a convex function of quality, the discriminatory pricing regime is
Pareto dominated by the uniform regime if and only if the following conditions
hold:
i/   0:343
ii/ b 2
h
FL()(
cH cL
sH sL  
cL
sL
) + cH cL
sH sL ; FH()(
cH cL
sH sL  
cL
sL
) + cH cL
sH sL
i
While discrimination allows the extraction of more surplus from a rst
group of buyers, uniform pricing o¤ers the advantage of less intense compe-
tition for the patronage of a second group of buyers. In the rst group one
nds the consumers who have a strong preference for a particular quality
when the two qualities are o¤ered at unit cost. The second group is made up
of consumers with a weak preference for a particular quality when the two
qualities are o¤ered at unit cost. A necessary condition for both rms to be
better o¤under discriminatory pricing is that each gains from the capacity to
extract surplus from the rst group a benet that exceeds the harm it su¤ers
as result of more intense competition for the second group. Discrimination
can yield a higher prot only if there is a su¢ cient disparity in qualities, or
equivalently if the ratio  = sL=sH is su¢ ciently small. ( < 0:343). Indeed,
when the latter condition is not met, there are no consumers with a strong
preference for a particular quality. However, this condition is not su¢ cient.
No rm prefers discrimination if the number of its captivebuyers is not
su¢ ciently large in relation to the number of its non-captivebuyers. This
explains why discrimination is Pareto-dominated only if the ratio of market
areas - the ratio of captiveto non-captivebuyers - takes on intermediate
13It is straigthforward to show that for c(s) = s2 a prisoners dilemma occurs for b 2
]2:45; 2:55[ when sH = 1; sL = 0:5 and for b 2]1:63; 1:9[ when sH = 1; sL = 0:25:
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values (FH() <  < FL()). Conversely, discriminatory price schedules are
dominant when both rms have captive consumers in numbers su¢ ciently
large relative to non-captivebuyers.
Because market shares and qualities are generally observable, one can
determine if the conditions of the last proposition are satised, on the basis
of information about the reservation price of consumers with the highest
willingness to pay.
The proposition carries an implication for competition policy: When the
conditions stated in the proposition are met, it is unlikely that a sudden
switch by duopolists from discriminatory pricing to uniform pricing - per-
haps via adoption of a most-favored customer clause - is brought about by
independent action.
It is useful at this stage to set the results against Choudhary et al. (2005).
These authors focus on the question how price and quality choices vary across
pricing regimes. They do so numerically for a more restricted class of cost
functions. The game, as Choudhary et al. describe it, unfolds as follows: At
stage 1, rms simultaneously choose qualities, at stage 2 they select prices,
and at stage 3 consumers decide which product, if any they purchase. Choud-
hary et al. (2005) start with the determination of equilibrium qualities for
each of four exogenously given pricing regimes and then they compare prof-
its across regimes taking into account of the fact that qualities as well as
prices vary from one regime to the other. They fail to account for the fact
that unless rms make a credible commitment to a particular pricing regime
before setting qualities at stage 1, it is optimal for each of them to choose
a discriminatory schedule at stage 2. This is true regardless of the qualities
selected. For that reason, their equilibria do not conform to the description
of their game and their comparison of prots does not shed light on the
circumstances that give rise to a prisoners dilemma.
This paper by contrast focuses on the question whether rms have an
incentive to agree to price uniformly for a given pair of qualities. This is
certainly appropriate when qualities are given exogeneously. It is also appro-
priate when all decisions in regard to pricing follow the selection of qualities
and are not constrained by the quality choices. The latter assumption ap-
pears more reasonable from an empirical perspective.14
14We are hesitant to compare our results with Choudhary et al. (2005) because of
a computational error in their paper. They nd that the prot of the H- rm in the
particular case where only the L- rm discriminates is equal to the prot of the H-rm
when both rms discriminate. As Table 1 shows the prot of the H-rm under the
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The following corollary compares the aggregate consumer surplus under
regimes (DH ; DL) and (UH ; UL).
Corollary: When the conditions ensuring the existence of a prisonners
dilemma are met, aggregate consumer surplus is higher when rms engage in
personalized pricing than when they price uniformly.
Proof: The proof follows from the denition of aggregate welfare and from
the result that aggregate welfare is maximized when the two rms choose
prot-maximizing discriminatory price schedules.
6 Quality choice by discriminating duopolists.
Until now qualities were given. This section characterizes the equilibrium
when qualities are endogenous. It does so for any density function f() and
convex unit cost function c(s). Do examine quality choices one must add an
initial stage to the game. At this initial stage both rms choose their qualities
independently within a bounded interval [0; S] where the upper value S is the
highest quality allowed by technology. The subsequent stages are identical
to the pricing game studied in the earlier sections. Because it has already
been established that the subgame perfect equilibrium pricing strategy is
discrimination by both rms regardless of quality, it is su¢ cient to consider
this regime.
For all sH > sL > 0; the Nash equilibrium in qualities satises the rst
order conditions (21) and (22) below, obtained from di¤erentiation of (9) and
(10) with respect to sH and sL.15Z b
c(sH ) c(sL)
sH sL
[   c0 (sH)] f()d = 0 (21)
Z c(sH ) c(sL)
sH sL
c(sL)
sL
[   c0 (sL)] f()d = 0 (22)
Conditions (21) and (22) simply state that the marginal cost of each
(UH ; DL) regime is only half as large as under the (DH ; DL) regime when the distribution
of consumer preferences is uniform.
15Convexity of the unit cost function implies that the second order conditions are sat-
ised.
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quality equals the average marginal utility of buyers of that quality.16
The following proposition characterizes the subgame-perfect equilibrium
in qualities
Proposition 4 For any density function of consumer preferences and convex
unit cost of quality, the sub-game perfect equilibrium qualities are socially
optimal.
Proof : Total welfare is
W (sH ; sL) =
Z c(sH ) c(sL)
sH sL
c(sL)
sL
(sL c(sL))f () d+
Z b
c(sH ) c(sL)
sH sL
(sH c(sH))f () d (23)
Di¤erentiation of (23) with respect to sL yields
@W (sH ; sL)
@sL
=
cH cL
sH sLZ
cL
sL
[   c0 (sL)] f () d
+

c(sH)  c(sL)
sH   sL sL   c(sL)

f

c(sH)  c(sL)
sH   sL

@[ c(sH) c(sL)
sH sL ]
@sL
 

c(sL)
sL
sL   c(sL)

f

c(sL)
sL

@[ c(sL)
sL
]
@sL
 

c(sH)  c(sL)
sH   sL sH   c(sH)

f

c(sH)  c(sL)
sH   sL

@[ c(sH) c(sL)
sH sL ]
@sL
= 0 (24)
One easily checks that the sum of the second and fourth terms of (24) is
zero. The reason is that a switch between high and low quality changes the
utility of the consumer  = cH cL
sH sL by an amount equal to the di¤erence in
cost of the two qualities. Also, the third term of (24) is zero because for the
consumer  = cL
sL
a change in quality changes utility by an amount equal to
the production cost. Thus, (24) simplies to (22).
16In order to conclude that conditions (21) and (22) dene a Nash equilibrium in qual-
ities, one must also establish that the rm producing the low quality has no incentive to
deviate from sL [given by (22)] and set quality higher than s

H . But this raises the usual
undeterminate question related to the identity of the rms, namely which one chooses the
high quality given that the other one chooses the low quality.
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Similarly di¤erentiation of (23) with respect to sH , yields

c(sH)  c(sL)
sH   sL sL   c(sL)

f

c(sH)  c(sL)
sH   sL

@[ c(sH) c(sL)
sH sL ]
@sH
+
Z c(sH ) c(sL)
sH sL
c(sL)
sL
[   c0 (sH)] f()d ()
 

c(sH)  c(sL)
sH   sL sH   c(sH)

f

c(sH)  c(sL)
sH   sL

@[ c(sH) c(sL)
sH sL ]
@sH
= 0 (25)
which simplies to (21) because the rst and third terms cancel out. QED
The reason why the rms choose welfare maximizing qualities is obvious.
Discrimination allows then to capture all the extra utility generated by an
extra unit of quality. This guarantees that the equilibrium qualities are
welfare maximizing when the cost of quality is convex.
7 Final Remarks
Perfect price discrimination is a Nash equilibrium of a game where quality
di¤erentiated duopolists determine rst whether to commit to a uniform price
and subsequently set prices and sell output. Whether specic consumers are
better o¤ under discrimination than under uniform pricing depends on the
extent to which they are captive to one of the sellers. Discrimination bene-
ts the consumers whose preference for one of the qualities is weak if both
qualities are priced at unit cost. With respect to these consumers, the com-
petition e¤ect of discrimination outweighs the enhanced surplus extraction
e¤ect. Consumers who have a strong preference for one of the qualities when
both are priced at unit cost, are worse o¤ under discrimination.
In contrast to earlier contributions that focused on horizontal di¤erenti-
ation, this paper nds that under vertical di¤erentiation both duopolists are
not necessarily better o¤when they enforce an agreement to price uniformly.
Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for both rms to earn higher prots un-
der rst-degree-discrimination are a su¢ ciently large disparity in qualities,
and a spread of consumer preferences for quality that is neither too large nor
too small. The paper also established that a unilateral move from uniform
pricing to personalized pricing lowers the rival rms prots. When consumer
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preferences are distributed uniformly and both rms engage in price discrim-
ination, a unilateral deviation toward uniform pricing halves the deviating
rms prot.
The industrial organization literature shows that the grant of a most-
favored customer clause by a single duopolist increases the prots of all
market participants by softening price competition. This paper shows that
uniform pricing is critical to this outcome. In the absence of a commitment
to uniform pricing, a unilateral grant of price protection to ones customers
is always harmful to the party making the grant. More generally, the pa-
per provides an easily veriable condition that can be used to formulate aa
presumption about the anticompetitive intent of a most-favored-customer
clause.
The paper also shows that for any exogenously given quality pair, compe-
tition in discriminatory prices schedules yields a welfare maximizing coverage
of the market, and a welfare maximizing segmentation into buyers of high
and low quality. Furthermore, the qualities chosen by discriminating rms
are welfare maximizing.
The paper has assumed that sellers have full information about con-
sumers. It disregarded the possibility of manipulation of the information by
consumers. It is clear that in practice much of the information is obtained by
analyzing surng patterns and purchasing history..This raises the question
how the choice of pricing regimes is a¤ected when buyers account for the
e¤ect of current purchases on future price o¤ers.17 Nevertheless, it remains
useful to model discrimination in the absence of strategic behavior because
only a minority of consumers is aware that information collected about their
purchasing behavior is shared, and may be used to price discriminate.18,
A policy implication of the paper is that imposing a minimum quality
requirement lowers aggregate welfare in presence of discriminatory pricing.
This contrasts with earlier results which show that a mildly restrictive qual-
ity standard raises welfare (Ronnen, 1991, Crampes and Hollander, 1995).
Under uniform pricing, a minimum quality requirement increases market cov-
erage as it narrows the quality gap and intensies price competition. Such
intensication also takes place when the rms engage in price discrimination.
The reason, however, is di¤erent. The narrower quality gap intensies price
17Some recent theoretical work (Acquisti and Varian (2003) and Villas-Boas (2003))
explores this question for the case of a monopolistic seller.
18Because the skills required to behave strategically are not widespread, one may assume
that the percentage of buyers who behave strategically is even lower.[Turow et al. (2005)]
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competition by expanding the range of non-captive consumers. Furthermore
a minimum quality requirement restricts market coverage when pricing is
discriminatory. More importantly, the paper suggest that a reduction of the
quality range - possibly in response to a minimum quality standard - may en-
courage rms to choose distribution channels or opt for contractual arrange-
ments that ensure uniform prices. When this happens, there is a further
reduction of market coverage, and a suboptimal segmentation of consumers
into high and low quality buyers.
The industrial organization literature has devoted much attention to the
question how market structure a¤ects price levels. This paper enlarges the
perspective by suggesting a new way through which market structure may
a¤ect the choice of a pricing regime. Entry for example, a¤ects incentives to
agree on unifom pricing when it reduces the disparity in qualities. This adds
a new twist to the welfare e¤ects of entry.
The standard reply to the question what di¤erentiates an incumbent from
an entrant is that the former can credibly commit to a course of action be-
fore the second rm appears on stage. The paper suggests that a greater
capacity to engage in di¤erential pricing may be an important distinguishing
characteristic between the incumbent and the entrant. A pre-entry adoption
of discriminatory pricing by the incumbent reveals information about buyers
reservation prices that the entrant cannot posses. The entrant is more likely
- at least initially - to set a uniform price, or divide consumers into fewer
classes for pricing purposes than the incumbent. The paper has shown that
a rm that prices uniformly earns lower prots when its rival discriminates
that when he prices uniformly. This suggests than an incumbent who dis-
criminates prior to entry is more likely to deter entry than an incumbent
who prices uniformly.19 For that reason, a threat of entry may encourage an
incumbent to incur the sunk cost of acquiring information about consumer
preferences.
The assumption that rms posses full information about individual reser-
vation prices and that this information is acquired at no cost, obviously lacks
realism (Varian, 2003). Information about consumer preferences is obtained
from the analysis of data garnered in part from costly experimentation (Cam-
inal and Matutes, 1990, Sha¤er and Zhang, 2000). The cost of dividing con-
19See in this regard Aguirre et al., 1998.There is clearly no reason for the incumbent
to move to uniform pricing post entry because discriminatory pricing gives the incumbent
higher prots regardless of the price policy adopted by the entrant
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sumers into di¤erent classes increases with the number of classes. For that
reason the problem in practice is not how to choose between perfect price
discrimination and uniform pricing. It is to determine the optimal number
of consumer classes considering that the cost of experimentation rises when
consumers are partitionned in ever ner classes. One may well nd that the
equilibrium number of consumer classes depends on the disparity of qualities.
Exactly how will have to await further research.
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Appendix 1: Non-existence of an equilibrium when simultaneously the
H-rm chooses a uniform price and the L-rm chooses a personalized price
scheme.
Proposition 5 The one-stage game where the high quality rm sets a uni-
form price and the low quality rm personalizes prices does not have an
equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof: We restrict the proof to the case of a uniform density where
f() = 1
b
for all  2 [0; b] :We already know that for a uniform price pH  cH ,
a best response of the low quality rm is given by:
pL(; pH) =
8<:
sL for
cL
sL
   pH
sH
pH   (sH   sL) for pHsH <  
pH cL
sH sL
cL for
pH cL
sH sL <   b
The prot of the high quality rm is therefore
H(pH ; pL(:; pH)) =
1
b
(pH   cH)(b  pH   cL
sH   sL )
We show rst that a pair [pH ; pL(; pH)] where pH > cH cannot be an
equilibrium. Take pH > cH and consider a deviation by rm H lowering its
price to epH = pH   where 0 <  < pH  cH : Consumers with  2 ]pHsH ; pH cLsH sL ]
switch to the high quality because sH pH+ > sL pH+(sH sL): Post
deviation, the prot of the high quality rm is eH = 1b (epH   cH)(b   epHsH ):
Therefore, eH   H = 1b [ (b   epHsH ) + (pH   cH)(pH cLsH sL   epHsH )]: Because
the second term on the right-hand-side can be made larger in absolute value
than the rst term, the deviation increases the prots of the high quality
rm. This proves that there cannot be an equilibrium in pure strategies
where pH > cH :
Consider now the case pH = cH which entails H = 0: The best response
of rm L is to sell to consumers  2
h
cH cL
sH sL ; b
i
at unit cost cL: If rm H
deviates by choosing pH = cH+
1
2
[b(sH sL)  (cH cL)] > cH , the consumer
 who is indi¤erent between high quality sold at pH and low quality sold at
unit cost must is dened by  = pH cL
sH sL =
1
2
[b+ cH cL
sH sL ]. Post deviation, the H
rm earns H = 1b (pH   cH)(b  ) > 0. This completes the proof.
Appendix 2: Derivation of Table 1
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7.0.1 Regime (UH ; DL)
The best response of the L-rm to a commitment by the H-rm is given
by (11) in the text. H(UH ; DL) = 1b [pH   cH ][b   pH cLsH sL ] attains a max-
imimum for pUH ;DLH =
1
2
[cH + cL + b(sH   sL)] implying H(UH ; DL) =
1
2b
[cL   cH + b (sH   sL)]
h
b  1
2

cH cL
sH sL + b
i
= sH sL
4b
[b   cH cL
sH sL ]
2:Note that b > cH cL
sH sL entails p
UH ;DL
H > cH : Ans,
substitution of pUH ;DLH into (11) yields
pUH ;DLL () =
8>><>>:
cL for   12
h
cH cL
sH sL + b
i
cH+cL+(b 2)(sH sL)
2
for 1
2
cH+cL+b(sH sL)
sH
<  < 1
2
[ cH cL
sH sL + b]
sL for
cL
sL
   1
2
cH+cL+b(sH sL)
sH
The quantity sold by the L-rm is1
b

1
2
[ cH cL
sH sL + b] 
cL
sL

: The low qual-
ity buyer who pays the highest price has preference index  = 1
2
cH+cL+b(sH sL)
sH
and pays the amount cH+cL+b(sH sL)
2
  cH+cL+b(sH sL)
2sH
(sH sL) = cH+cL+b(sH sL)2 slsH :
The prot earned from that consumer is

cH cL+2cL+b(sH sL)
2sH

sL   cL =
(sH sL)
2
sL
sH

b+ cH cL
sH sL

+ sL
sH
cL   cL
= (sH sL)
2
sL
sH

b+ cH cL
sH sL

  (sH sL)
sH
cL =
sL(sH sL)
sH
h
1
2

b+ cH cL
sH sL

  cL
sL
i
:
Because the distribution of 0s is uniform, the average prot per unit sold
by the L-rm is half that amount. Therefore L= 12b
sL(sH sL)
sH
[1
2
(b+ cH cL
sH sL ) 
cL
sL
]2:
7.0.2 Regime (DH ; UL)
When the L-rm commits to a uniform price pL 2]cL; cH [; the H-rm re-
sponds by choosing (16). The prot of the L-rm is L(DH ; UL) = 1b [pL  
cL][
cH pL
sH sL 
pL
sL
]: It attains a maximum for pDH ;ULL =
1
2
h
cL +
sL
sH
cH
i
=sL
2
h
cH
sH
+ cL
sL
i
implying
pDH ;ULL  cL = sL2
h
cH
sH
  cL
sL
i
:Also, cH pL
sH sL =
2cH cL  sLsH cH
sH sL =
1
2

cH cL
sH sL +
cH
sH

;
and p
DH;UL
L
sL
= 1
2
( cL
sL
+ cH
sH
): Because sL < sH , is must be true that p
DH ;UL
L 2
]cL; cH [: Therefore L = 1b
sL
2
h
cH
sH
  cL
sL
i h
1
2

cH cL
sH sL +
cH
sH

  1
2
( cL
sL
+ cH
sH
)
i
=
25
sL
4b
h
cH
sH
  cL
sL
i h
cH cL
sH sL  
cL
sL
i
The market segment served by theH-rm is b  cH pL
sH sL = b 
2cH  cL  sLsH cH
2(sH sL) =
b  cH  cL+(1 
sL
sH
)cH
2(sH sL) = b  12
h
cH cL
sH sL +
cH
sH
i
:
Substitution of pDH ;ULL into (16) yields p
DH ;UL
H () =
8<:
1
2
h
cL +
sL
sH
cH
i
+ (sH   sL) for 12
h
cH cL
sH sL +
cH
sH
i
   b
cH for  <
1
2
h
cH cL
sH sL +
cH
sH
i
The average prot margin of the H-rm over the segment it serves is
1
2

pDH ;ULH (b)  cH

= 1
2
h
1
2

cL +
sL
sH
cH

+ b (sH   sL)  cH
i
= sH sL
2
h
b  cH cL
2(sH sL)  
sH sL
2(sH sL)
cH
sH
i
= sH sL
2
h
b  1
2

cH cL
(sH sL) +
cH
sH
i
:Thus,
the prot of the H-rm is H(DH ; UL) = sH sL2b
h
b  1
2

cH cL
(sH sL) +
cH
sH
i2
:
When pL  cH , the H-rm sells to all consumers with  2
h
cH
sH
; b
i
for
a price pH() = sH : No consumer with  2
h
cL
sL
; cH
sH
i
is willing to purchase
low quality product at the uniform price pL  cH : More pointedly, when
pL  cH ; the high quality producer has a monopoly position and the low
quality producer has no market at all. Therefore, choosing pL  cH is never
rational on the part of a leader who produces the low quality.
7.0.3 Regime (UH ; UL)
This is the standard case examined in the literature [Gabszewicz and Thisse
(1979), Shaked and Sutton (1982), Moorthy (1988, 1991)]. Prot func-
tions are H(pH ; pL) = 1b (pH   cH)(b   pH pLsH sL ) and L(pH ; pL) = 1b (pL  
cL)(
pH pL
sH sL  
pL
cL
): Simultaneous choice of prices by each rms yields pUH ;ULH =
sH
4sH sL [2b(sH   sL) + 2cH + cL] and p
UH ;UL
L =
1
4sH sL [bsL(sH   sL) + 2cLsH +
cHsL]
Substitution into the prot function yields the prots that appear in Table
1.
Appendix 3: Proof of the lemma.
The inequalityH(DH ; DL) = sH sL2b [b  cH cLsH sL ]2 > H(UH ; UL) =
4s2H(sH sL)
(4sH sL)2b [b 
1
2
( cH cL
sH sL +
cH
sH
)]2
=
4s2H(sH sL)
(4sH sL)2b [b  
cH cL
sH sL +
1
2
( cH cL
sH sL  
cH
sH
)]2 is equivalent to b   cH cL
sH sL >
26
2
p
2sH
4sH sL [b 
cH cL
sH sL +
1
2
sL
sH
( cH cL
sH sL  
cL
sL
)] orh
b  cH cL
sH sL
i
[1  2
p
2sH
4sH sL ] >
p
2 sH
4sH sL
sL
sH
[ cH cL
sH sL  
cL
sL
]: Thus,
H(DH ; DL) > H(UH ; UL),  > FH() =
p
2
4  2p2   (21)
Because L(DH ; DL) = sL2b [
cH cL
sH sL  
cL
sL
][ cH
sH
  cL
sL
] = sL(sH sL)
2bsH
[ cH cL
sH sL  
cL
sL
]2
and L(UH ; UL) =
4sLsH(sH sL)
(4sH sL)2b [
1
2
(b+ cH cL
sH sL ) 
cL
sL
)]2 we have L(DH ; DL) >
L(UH ; UL) if and only if cH cLsH sL  
cL
sL
< 2
p
2sH
4sH sL [
1
2
(b  cH cL
sH sL ) + (
cH cL
sH sL  
cL
sL
)]
or
( cH cL
sH sL  
cL
sL
)

1  2
p
2sH
4sH sL

<
p
2sH
4sH sL (b 
cH cL
sH sL )
Thus
L(DH ; DL) > L(UH ; UL),  < FL() = 4  2
p
2  p
2
(22)
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